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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
concluded that the GATT 1947 may be interpreted and applied in the context of the New
Commercial Policy Instrument in order to establish whether certain specific commercial
practices should be considered incompatible with those rules. The ECJ's statement there-
fore should be interpreted as referring to provisions that make a general reference to inter-
national law and not only to specific obligations of the WTO agreements.37
In addition, attention should be drawn to the important rule of consistent interpretation:
where a provision in municipal law is amenable to different interpretations, it must be con-
strued to conform to international obligations.38 In many cases, this rule of interpretation
permits courts to bridge alleged divergences between international and municipal law, mak-
ing adherence to both possible without sacrificing the uniformity of obligations under inter-
national law. The ECJ's decision in HermffsInternational 9 applies this interpretive rule to the
relationship between EC law and the WTO agreements.
In the end, the EGJ Decision suggests that it is probably unrealistic to expect that the ques-
tion of the direct effect of WTO law within the internal legal system of the EC can be suc-
cessfully dissociated from the question of its direct effect within the internal legal systems
of the EC's major trading partners. Nevertheless, the willingness of the ECJ to accord "in-
direct effect" to the WTO agreements as defined in Nakajima and Fediol, together with the
principle of consistent interpretation, offers alternatives that moderate the impact of the
decision to deny direct effect to the WTO agreements even when invoked by member states.
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UNITED STATES V. LOCKE. 120 S.Ct. 1135.
Supreme Court of the United States, March 6, 2000.
Following the Exxon Valdez accident off Alaska in 1989, the legislature of the State of
Washington created an Office of Marine Safety, directing this agency to establish standards
that would govern ship traffic in state waterways and provide "the best available protection
from damages caused by the discharge of oil."' The office thereafter promulgated elaborate
regulations addressing oil tanker design, equipment requirements, and reporting and
operating rules.2
The International Association of Independent Tank Owners (Intertanko), a trade associ-
ation of 305 members owning or operating more that two thousand U.S. or foreign-registry
tankers, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District ofWashington. Seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, Intertanko contended that the state regulations addressed
matters falling within the exclusive responsibility of the U.S. government. Intertanko filed
with the district court diplomatic correspondence directed to the United States by thirteen
nations expressing concern that the state rules would lead to inconsistencies between U.S.
s7 See Femando Castillo de la Torre, The Status ofGA7Tin ECLaw, Revisited 29J. WORLD TRADE 53, 59-61 (1995).
s According to the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murrayv. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 188 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).
" See Case C-53/96 Herms International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 ECR 1-3603.
IWASH. REV. CODE §88.46.040(3) (1994).
2 WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§317-21-130 to 317-21-540 (1999). But see note 37 infra (enforcement of regulations
suspended). Ships failing to comply with these regulations are subject, by the parent statute, to penalties, restric-
tions on operation in state waters, or denial of entry to state waters. SeeWASH. REv. CODE §§88.46.070-.090 (1994).
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and state regulations and thus create uncertainty and confusion.3 The district court rejected
the Intertanko arguments and upheld the Washington regulations.4 Thereafter, following
Intertanko's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States
intervened, also disputing the validity of the Washington regulations. The Ninth Circuit
panel nonetheless largely agreed with the district court, declaring invalid only one Wash-
ington rule, which required vessels to install specified navigation and towing equipment.'
Granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings.6Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the
unanimous Court.
The Locke opinion began by noting the political and economic geography of Puget
Sound-the most prominent of the bodies of water subject to state oversight. The Strait of
Juan de Fuca is not only the access channel to the sound from the Pacific Ocean, but also
the site of the boundary between Canada and the United States and the sole means of access
to Vancouver, Canada's largest port.7 "Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether
destined to ports in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington's waters;
outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or Vancouver, is directed through
Canadian waters."' U.S. and foreign-flag oil tankers are prominentwithin this traffic. "Wash-
ington is... the destination or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its end products."'
Justice Kennedy then observed that the Washington legislation and regulations addressed
matters-navigation and marine transport-in which "the federal interest has been manifest
since the beginning of our Republic."" Emphasizing the point at some length, Kennedy's
opinion quoted from the Federalist, early federal statutes, and several of the Supreme Court's
own classic opinions. Congress had, in particular, enacted several statutes addressing marine
tanker transport and had also approved a number of treaties pertaining to the same sub-
ject." The court of appeals thought that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, itself enacted in re-
sponse to the Exxon Valdez accident, was the most pertinent of the congressional initiatives,
and emphasized language in this statute recognizing continued state authority to impose
"additional liability or additional requirements.., relating to the discharge, or substantial
threat of a discharge, of oil." 2 The Supreme Court, however, concluded that this savings
clause did not limit the impact of the earlier Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
(PWSA), and thus that the Court's analysis of the preemptive effect of this statute, pro-
nounced in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,13 remained on point. 4 PWSA authorizes (but does
not require) federal officials to promulgate rules relating to control of vessel traffic and
other matters relating to navigation (Title I), and requires federal officials to issue regu-
lations concerning the seaworthiness and manning of vessels, as well as the qualifications
of personnel (Title II).l 5Justice Kennedy understood Ray as reading PWSA to "preserve []
3 See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1142 (2000).
4 Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
'Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998). With one dissent,
the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. See Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
v. Locke, 159 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).
'United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1152.
7 Id. at 1141.
' Id.; see Canada-U.S. Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca
Region, Dec. 17, 1979, 32 UST 377, TIAS No. 9706, 1221 UNTS 67.
'United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1141.
' "Id. at 1143.
" See id. at 1143-45.
12 33U.S.C. §2718(c) (1994); seelnt'lAss'n ofIndep.Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1058-60,1062,
13 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
4 See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1145-47.
"The pertinent provisions are codified at 33 U.S.C. §1223(a) (1) (1999 ed. Supp. III) (referred to by the Supreme
Court as Title I), and 46 U.S.C. §3703 (a) (1994) (referred to as Title II). See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1144,
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state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters if there was no conflict with federal
regulatory determinations," but to authorize "only the Federal Government" to adopt "na-
tional regulations governing the general seaworthiness of tankers and their crews."16
Justice Kennedy acknowledged "some overlapping" of the pertinent categories: regu-
lations concerning "local waters" (matters of state competence if not in actual conflict with
federal rules) and regulations addressing "general seaworthiness" (the exclusive respon-
sibility of federal agencies). In any particular instance, characterization would depend on
the content of promulgated federal regulations (including rules originating in ratified con-
ventions and statutes other than PWSA); the specific matters that PWSA included in its list
of seaworthiness issues; whether or not state regulations at issue are 'Justified by conditions
unique to a particular port or waterway"; and whether the state regulations have a "limited
extraterritorial effect."18 "Local rules not pre-empted... [are those that] pose a minimal
risk of innocent noncompliance, do not affect vessel operations outside thejurisdiction, do
not require adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do not impose a substantial
burden on the vessel's operations within the local jurisdiction itself."19
The Locke Court examined four of the challenged Washington regulations in order to
"illustrate [I]" its statement of the applicable analysis (the remaining regulations were left to
be considered by the court ofappeals on remand).2 The Washington training requirements
and English-language proficiency rules had obvious extraterritorial effects and were there-
fore "not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities."21 The Washington navi-
gation-watch procedures, which governed independent of immediate weather conditions,
were applicable throughout the state and therefore insufficiently linked "to the peculiarities
of Puget Sound."22 Finally, the state requirement that vessels approaching its waters report
marine casualties-collisions, near misses, mechanical breakdowns, and so on-was incon-
sistent with federal legislation independent of PWSA that gives federal officials responsibility
for casualty-reporting rules.
23
The notable absence of any express disagreement within the Supreme Court in Locke,24
and the fact that all four of the Court's illustrative rulings concluded that state regulations
were preempted, together suggest that the justices readily appreciated the conjoined na-
6 United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1149; see Ray, 435 U.S. at 158-78. The first half of the Rayformula is based
on Title I of PWSA, the second derives from Title II. See note 15 supra.
'7 United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1149.
'
8 Id. at 1149-50.
1 Id. at 1150. Readers knowing something of the law of the sea will be aware that a somewhat similar con-
struction is put to use on the international level. The rules regarding the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea prohibit coastal state regulation that hampers innocent passage or has the practical effect of denying
or impairingsuch passage-in particular, coastal state regulation of the design, construction, manning or equip-
ment of foreign ships unless giving effect to generally accepted international standards. These rules do not,
however, restrict coastal state conditions for port entry or apply to those internal waters in which there is no right
of innocent passage. SeeUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedforsignatureDec. 10,1982, Arts.
8, 17, 21 (2), 24(1), 25(2), 1833 UNTS 397, reprinted in 21 ILM 1261 (1982). For present purposes, what is most
interesting about the international formula is its absence (the dog that does not bark) within the analysis in the
Locke opinion itself.
0 United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1150.
I11d. The Washington requirements were read as addressing operations and personnel-qualifications matters
falling within PWSA Title II, see 46 U.S.C. §3703 (a) (1994).Justice Kennedy found support for this conclusion in
federal regulations fixing crew-training requirements, 46 C.F.1L pts. 10,12,13,15 (1999). The International Con-
vention ofStandards ofTraining, Certification and Watchkeepingfor Seafarers, withAnnex, 1978, S. TREATYDoc.
No. 96-1, C.T.I.A. No. 7624, also addressed crew-training and qualification requirements.
I United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1151.
"Id. at 1151-52; see46U.S.C. §6101 (1994); see also id. §6102 (federal responsibility for devisinguniform system
of state marine-casualty reporting).24 In Ray, by contrast, the Supreme Courtsplit complicatedly. SeeRayv. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,153
(1978) (syllabus).
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tional and international dimensions of the case. Justice Kennedy's opinion is not without
discordant notes, however. Notwithstanding its acknowledgment of the multinational geog-
raphy of the case, Locke declined to treat international law-or even international concerns-
as immediately disposiive.25 But Kennedy read PWSA-which he did treat as decisive-to
have as one aim the conformity of U.S. law with international standards." International
norms were in one sense irrelevant, and in another, relevant. The Locke opinion does not
explain why this cross-cut form of argument was necessary.
Some citational choices are also curious. In the course of grounding his opinion in the
grand Supreme Court discussions of the early nineteenth centuryJustice Kennedy referred
to, but did not much emphasize, Gibbons v. Ogden2 7 and its virtuoso amalgam of constitu-
tional and statutory preemptive arguments. Kennedy instead gave pride of place to Cooley
v. Board of Port Wardens,2 8 famous to generations of law students precisely for its efforts to
define a rightful place for state regulation of national and international maritime transit.
Similarly, the Locke opinion identified the point of departure for preemption analysis as
such to be the Supreme Court's decision in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,29 written byJustice
Douglas in a way that acknowledged the frequent coexistence of state and federal law.30
Surprisingly, the Court did not invoke Hines v. Davidowitzt--decided only a fewyears before
Rice--in which Justice Black emphatically minimized the relevance of state law in matters
with international overtones, such as immigration and naturalization.
32
Justice Kennedy, it appears, was concerned to remove from the case any "beginning as-
sumption that concurrent regulation by the State [in this case, Washington] is a valid exer-
cise of its police powers."3 But he did not mean to put in place an opposed presumption,
even against the backdrop of "national and international commerce."' State regulation was
to be judged by reference to "federal statutory structure."" "No artificial presumption aids
us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA... ." As a
result, itis easy to notice the opinion's acknowiedgement that some Washington regulations
could conceivably pass the PWSA tests.
37
'Justice Kennedy briefly mentioned "[i]llustrative... treaties and agreements," United States v. Locke, 120
S.Ct. at 1145, and also noted the United States' argument that"these treaties... have pre-emptive force over the
state regulations in question here." Id. "We need not reach that issue... because the state regulations ... are pre-
empted by federal statute and regulations." Id. Itwas possible, Kennedy allowed, that treaty terms might become
pertinent at later stages in the litigation. Id.
26 See id. at 1145, 1149, quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 166, 168.
' 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1924).
2 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). For the Locke discussion of Gibbons and Cooley, see 120 S.Ct. at 1143.
2 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
o See id. at 230-36.Justice Kennedyfound it necessary to proceed at some length to distinguish Rice from Locke
itself. SeeUnited States v. Locke, 120S.Ct. at 1147-48. Ostensibly, Ricewas relevantbecause Ray briefly quoted from
it (seeRay, 435 U.S. at 157, quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) and because in Lockeitself, the courts below and the State
of Washington had invoked it. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1147. It is not obvious, however, why this
reliance, in and of itselfjustifies using three paragraphs of the Locke opinion to parse Rice. Butsee id. (Ricewill not
be studied "in detail").
3' 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
-2 See id. at 62-68.
33 United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1148.
3 Id.
3 Id.
'Id. Interestingly, in Crosby v. NationalForeign Trade Counci4 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000), see Brannon P. Denning &
Jack H. McCall, Case Report: Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 94AJIL 750 (2000), in which Massachu-
setts's "Burma law" was held to be preempted by federal statutesJustice Souter's majority opinion cited Hines (see
Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2294), but only in connection with standard preemption formulas. Like Justice Kennedy in
Locke, Souter treated the case as an ordinary preemption challenge. See Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2294 n.8 (reserving
question of "presumption against preemption," citing Locke) (emphasis added).
37 SeeUnited States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1148,1152.Justice Kennedywas notably careful, however-especially
in concluding the opinion-not to press the point. See also State v. Stepansky, 761 So.2d 1027, 1034 (Fla. 2000)
(relying on limited preemption in Lockeand upholding state law providing for state prosecution of crimes com-
mitted on board Florida-based cruise ships at sea). A case report on Stepansky is scheduled to appear in the next
issue of theJournal
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There is a perhaps important gap in the Supreme Court's discussion. If aWashington regu-
lation-say, one redrafted after Locke3 8-on its face restricts its reach to tanker activitywithin
Puget Sound, and if the administrative processes leading up to the regulation reveal a
record seemingly replete with evidence ofrisky local peculiarities and thus oflocal concerns,
how does the preemption analysis play out if there are, for example, no Coast Guard regu-
lations precisely on point? Is it the responsibility of critics of proposed state rules to intro-
duce into the state record evidence of "adjustment of systematic aspects" and "substantial
burdens" likely to be occasioned by the state regulations? If state officials are not persuaded
by such evidence, and if they explain their conclusions, do usual doctrines of deference to
administrative judgments apply? Are tanker interests free to sidestep state processes and
proceed directly to federal courts once regulations are promulgated, propounding their
criticisms for the first time at this stage?
It is possible to begin answering these questions by asking yet one more. Notwithstanding
the ultimate style of the case, United States v. Locke started out as private litigation. Nothing in
the Supreme Court opinion suggests that the involvement of the United States was necessary
to the suit's progress. What was the right of action that the tanker owner association asserted?
Intertanko based its claim to federal jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1337(a).'
These statutes do generally authorize district court involvement but by their terms also
suppose some other, more specific statutory or constitutional recognition of a private right to
sue.4" Neither PWSA nor the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution confers such a right
explicitly.41 The Supreme Court nonetheless did not stop in Locke to explore the rigors of its
implied-rightsjurisprudence.' The Court has, however, at least since 1989, treated 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983-authorizing legal and equitable remedies for infringements of federal rights
by individuals acting under color of state law-as a pertinent right of action in preemption
cases.' The Supreme Court's Section 1983jurisprudence usefully addresses issues that Locke
itself did not resolve. Litigants usually need not, for example, exhaust state administrative or
judicial remedies, but may instead challenge rules in federal district court once state legis-
lative or administrative initiatives acquire final form." Section 1983 suits are not subject to
the Anti-Injunction Act.' Insofar as their concern with color of law is rooted in the Four-
teenth Amendment, Exparte Young4" proceedings against state officials-seeking injunctive
or declaratory relief authorized by Section 1983-are not open to the state sovereign-
immunity scrutiny that the Supreme Court brings to bear in reviewing, for example, actions
based on the Commerce Clause.47 Finally, the substance of Section 1983 analysis, because
" OnJune 12, 2000, the Washington State Department of Ecology suspended enforcement of the regulations
at issue in Locke pending adoption of new regulations. See Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v.
Locke, 216 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
"' SeeBrief on the Merits for Petitioner Intertanko at 6, United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000) (No. 98-
1706), available in 1999 WL 966536.
4 SeeFranchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1983); 13B CHARLESALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §3574 (2d ed. 1984).
41 See 46 U.S.C. §§3713, 3718 (1994) (PWSA civil-penalty remedy for violation of federal requirements en-
forceable by the United States); Chapman v. Houston WRO, 441 U.S. 600,613 (1979) (Supremacy Clause "is not
a source of any federal rights").
4 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIELJ.
MELTZER, & DAvID L. SHAPIRo, HARTAND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTSAND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 839-46 (4th
ed. 1996).
" See, e.g., Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
103 (1989). SeegenerallyHenry Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review UnderSection 1983 and theAPA, 91 CoLUM. L. REV.
233 (1991).
4See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
46 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On color of law, see Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of"Law, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 323 (1992).
" On Exparte Youngas a Section 1983 case, see David P. Currie, Exparte YoungAfLer Seminole Tribe; 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 547 (1997). SeegenerallyErnestA.Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 1.
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of its twin emphases on the presence of federal rights and the possibility that state officials
are pursuing agendas insufficiently grounded in actual state concerns, may provide a ready
framework within which a hard look at state rules can be justified.
Section 1983 does presuppose, however, federal "rights, privileges, or immunities"48-
which may be one reason why Justice Kennedy attributed only background relevance to
international agreements. To be immediately pertinent for Section 1983 purposes, treaty
terms would seemingly need to be self-executing.49 PWSA provisions appear to meet Su-
preme Court requirements for enforceability. Title II and-where the Coast Guard has
issued regulations in conflict with state law-Title I are properly read to impose the binding
obligations on state officials that the Supreme Court requires." These obligations are not
just a consequence of the Supremacy Clause, but are, more precisely, concomitants of the
relationships thatPWSA establishes. The statutory provisions impose specific legal duties on
tanker operations; states are bound not to interfere with performance of these duties-and
thus operators hold correlative rights vis Avis states." This analysis, obviously, also shows that
state obligations are for the benefit of tanker operators.5 2 Justice Kennedy's acknowledg-
ment of the international preoccupations informing PWSA's terms is also apposite. Mare
liberum is a proposition-perhaps most obviously so in its Grotian articulation-that takes
as its point of departure the pursuit by individuals of individual interests. At bottom, little
turns on whether these individuals are private actors or states. What does matter, instead,
is whether bodies of water capable in fact of being used by all remain in law open to com-
mon use. Common right, here at least, subsumes individual rights.5 3
PATRICK 0. GUDRIDGE
University of Miami School of Law
U.S. constitutional law-state statutes imposing indirect sanctions on foreign countries-federal pre-
emption-sanctions against Myanmar (Burma)
CROSBYV. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL. 120 S.Ct. 2288.
Supreme Court of the United StatesJune 19, 2000.
In June 1996, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a law' aimed at indirectly
punishing the repressive State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military govern-
ment of Myanmar (formerly Burma) by broadly preventing companies and individuals that
did business with Myanmar from doing business with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and its agencies. In April 1998, the law was challenged in federal district court by the Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council, a 550-member trade group comprising corporations and fi-
nancial institutions involved in overseas trade and international investment. Both the district
court and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against the state, hold-
ing that the statute was inconsistentwith the Constitution's "dormant" foreign affairs power.
The First Circuit also held that the statute violated preemption principles and the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed, but solely on
4 SeeBlessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
SeeBacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161-63 (1940).
5 SeeBlessing, 520 U.S. at 341; Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132-33 (1994).
51SeeWilderv. VirginiaHosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,512-14 (1990); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 366 (1943).52 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
53 See generally RIcHARD TucK, PHLOSOPHYAND GOvERNMENT, 1572-1651, at 154-201 (1993).
' See MASS. GEN. LAWANN. ch. 7 §22G-J (West Supp. 1998).
2 National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); National Foreign Trade Council v.
Baker, 26 F. Supp.2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). See generally Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, The Constitutionality
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